Zimbabwe’s Railway Seeks $115M Loan After 84% Freight Collapse

Zimbabwe’s national railway hauled 12.4 million tonnes of freight in 1998. In 2025, it moved just 2.03 million tonnes.

Those two numbers tell the entire story of what nearly three decades of infrastructure neglect does to a rail network, and they explain why a state-owned enterprise is now scrambling to secure institutional financing to reverse the slide.

The timing is not accidental. Zimbabwe’s lithium, chrome, coal, and ferrochrome producers are expanding output while the network meant to carry that bulk freight operates at a fraction of its historical capacity, pushing operators onto costly road haulage and inflating export logistics bills across the region.

The Mutapa Investment Fund, which now controls National Railways of Zimbabwe (NRZ), is pursuing a US$115 million facility from the African Export-Import Bank (Afreximbank), the first structured institutional attempt to rebuild a broken corridor. This Zimbabwe railway investment push sits alongside a far larger rehabilitation programme under negotiation with Chinese partners.

What follows below is a clear account of what NRZ is actually seeking, what the money would fund, how wide the remaining financing gap runs, and what a realistic recovery looks like for mining operators tracking bulk commodity export infrastructure in southern Africa.

Zimbabwe’s railways have collapsed to a fraction of their former capacity. Here is what that means for mineral exports

The reference point is the late 1990s. According to the most precisely attributed figure available, NRZ hauled 12.4 million tonnes in 1998, the network’s high-water mark.

By 2025, that figure had fallen to roughly 2.03 million tonnes, a collapse of about 84% across 27 years. Reuters and SMM Chromium Flash, both reporting in September 2026, round the recent baseline to around 2 million tonnes, while Travelnews.africa cited 2.1 million tonnes for 2025. The consensus range sits between 2.0 and 2.1 million tonnes.

The core throughput statistic NRZ freight volume fell from 12.4 million tonnes in 1998 to approximately 2.03 million tonnes in 2025, a decline of roughly 84%.

The causes are well documented across September 2026 reporting. The collapse is attributed to:

• Sustained government underinvestment, flagged directly by Reuters and SMM Chromium Flash
• Ageing track and deteriorated rail infrastructure
• Slow wagon turnaround times and limited track capacity
• Absence of signalling upgrades, contributing to what World Rail Insight describes as “severe operational bottlenecks”
• The steady shift of shippers onto road haulage as rail reliability eroded

Why the mining sector is now driving the pressure to act

This is not an abstract infrastructure metric. For mining operators, the 84% throughput collapse is the direct reason bulk commodity logistics in Zimbabwe cost more and take longer than they should, and it is precisely the problem the financing effort targets.

Lithium, chrome, coal, and ferrochrome producers are the freight constituencies the rehabilitation is meant to serve. As rail capacity fell away, ferrochrome smelters, chrome miners, coal operators, and lithium producers were forced onto road transport, driving up logistics costs and piling pressure onto major road corridors.

EcofinAgency, reporting on 19 September 2026, explicitly frames the Afreximbank facility pursuit as a response to the fact that “mining creates new freight demand.” The gap between what an expanding resources sector needs and what a degraded railway can deliver has become commercially acute, and that is what put this deal on the table now.

What the US$115 million Afreximbank facility would actually fund

Here is the precise state of play. As of 30 September 2026, the US$115 million Afreximbank facility has not been signed or formally approved. Negotiations are being led by the Mutapa Investment Fund, with Afreximbank as the lending counterpart.

The language across September 2026 coverage is consistent. Reuters reported on 17 September that NRZ “was talking to” Afreximbank; Business Insider Africa described Zimbabwe as “seeking” the loan; SMM Chromium Flash characterised NRZ as “negotiating” the facility. Earlier reporting from Zimbabwe Situation in May 2026 suggested the deal was being finalised, but subsequent coverage reverted to negotiation language, indicating it was not concluded in the intervening months.

The intended use of funds is specific: procurement of 10 new locomotives and 315 wagons, plus repair of sections of NRZ’s ageing track. Miner.africa confirms that part of the facility is set aside for track repair, meaning even this partial package addresses both rolling stock and infrastructure.

The scale, however, is where operators should keep expectations grounded. The US$115 million represents less than one-fifth of the total capital requirement identified by Mutapa Investment Fund CEO John Mangudya.

The total capital requirement Mangudya has estimated that NRZ requires around US$600 million to close infrastructure gaps, acquire new rolling stock, and upgrade workshops.

The read for operators is straightforward. The Afreximbank facility is a meaningful start, but it addresses less than a fifth of the identified gap. That means the trajectory of any rail recovery depends heavily on whether the larger Chinese programme and additional financing sources are concluded.

How Zimbabwe’s rail network fits into the southern African minerals corridor

Zimbabwe’s value is not only domestic. Its geography places it as a transit corridor linking landlocked Zambia and the Democratic Republic of Congo to export ports in South Africa and Mozambique.

That position gives restored NRZ capacity regional freight implications well beyond Zimbabwe’s own mining output. World Rail Insight, reporting on 21 September 2026, emphasises that rebuilding the network matters for handling both domestic bulk commodity exports and regional transit traffic, a strategic rationale that lifts the stakes considerably.

Ahead of the major financing deals, NRZ has already put interim measures in place to claw back capacity:

• A partnership with ferrochrome producer Zimasco, which has commissioned 3 refurbished locomotives and 100 wagons
• Leased Sheltam locomotives deployed to address immediate traction deficits
• Stepped-up collaborations with private logistics firms, as reported by Reuters

The Zimasco arrangement matters beyond its own tonnage. It is identified as a potential template for broader mining company involvement, a model under which larger operators might contribute dedicated rolling stock or commit to long-term freight contracts before the big financing packages land.

The stated ambition Travelnews.africa framed Zimbabwe’s rail plans as signalling “a new era for bulk cargo and regional trade,” projecting throughput growth toward 12 million tonnes by 2030.

For mining operators and logistics planners in Zambia or DRC, whether Zimbabwe’s recapitalisation succeeds is not a peripheral question. It directly shapes the cost and reliability of their own bulk commodity export routes to the coast.

The 2030 freight target requires far more than one loan facility

The headline ambition is a target, but it functions better as a test. NRZ is aiming for 12 million tonnes annually by 2030, roughly a six-fold increase from the 2025 baseline within five years.

The scale of the required increase NRZ intends to grow freight throughput from approximately 2.03 million tonnes in 2025 to 12 million tonnes by 2030.

An earlier indicator sits closer to hand. A near-term target of approximately 3.01 million tonnes for the current year would offer a first read on whether the turnaround is on track, though this figure appears only in the most precisely attributed source and is not confirmed across broader reporting.

Reaching the 2030 goal depends on four conditions being met, not one loan:

1. Full mobilisation of the US$600 million rehabilitation package, or equivalent funding, covering track, signalling and workshops
2. Successful conclusion and disbursement of the US$115 million Afreximbank facility alongside additional rolling stock investment
3. Effective execution of NRZ’s three-phase turnaround strategy
4. Operational reliability strong enough to pull shippers back from road haulage and onto rail

Risks that could delay or derail the recovery timeline

Under-capitalisation is the clearest risk. The Chinese programme and additional financing remain unconcluded, and Business Insider Africa and EcofinAgency both flag the funding gap explicitly. Until it closes, the plan stays critically underfunded.

Execution complexity is the second. Coordinating track, signalling, rolling stock, and workshop upgrades with Chinese contractors is a substantial undertaking, and World Rail Insight notes a potential Resource-for-Infrastructure model for the China Railway component that adds further complexity around deal structure and sequencing.

Service competitiveness is the third, and it is inferred from the market dynamics rather than quantified in named commentary. Shippers who moved to road haulage will not automatically return. NRZ must demonstrate reliable, cost-competitive service to win those volumes back.

For operators evaluating Zimbabwe as a freight corridor, the gap between US$115 million and the US$600 million total requirement is the clearest signal that the recovery timeline hinges on financing decisions not yet made.

What the NRZ recapitalisation signals for bulk commodity logistics in southern Africa

The central tension is easy to state. Zimbabwe holds a strategically valuable rail corridor position in southern Africa, but the current financing effort covers less than one-fifth of the identified capital need, leaving recovery dependent on deals still under negotiation.

The Mutapa Investment Fund is pursuing this on multiple tracks, mobilising local, regional and Chinese financing in parallel rather than relying on any single facility. The Afreximbank package is the smaller, nearer-term component; the China Railway programme is larger but more complex, and neither is signed.

For bulk commodity operators, these are the indicators to watch in the coming months:

• Signing and disbursement of the Afreximbank facility
• Progress on the China Railway International Group negotiations
• The near-term freight volume result against the roughly 3.01 million tonne target
• Whether the Zimasco-style partnership model expands to other mining operators

The most important number here is not the US$115 million being sought. It is the roughly US$485 million gap between that figure and the estimated total requirement. That gap determines whether Zimbabwe’s corridor becomes commercially viable within the decade or stays an underperforming logistics asset. Until it is materially closed, rail logistics in Zimbabwe should be planned against current capacity, not projected recovery timelines.

This article is for informational purposes only and should not be considered financial advice. Investors should conduct their own research and consult with financial professionals before making investment decisions.

Past performance does not guarantee future results. Financial projections are subject to market conditions and various risk factors, and forward-looking targets described here are plans under negotiation rather than confirmed outcomes.