bp, XRG and UCC Secure Equal Stakes in Venezuela’s Loran Gas Licence

bp, XRG, and UCC Oil and Gas have each received an equal working interest in the Loran Phase 2 offshore gas project, a Venezuelan licence area estimated to hold around 4 trillion cubic feet (Tcf) of recoverable gas. The licence, reported in mid-August 2026 by Reuters and the Wall Street Journal, marks one of the most significant Latin American energy awards to involve Gulf-state capital.

The deal sits at the intersection of three forces that rarely converge in a single project: ADNOC’s accelerating push to build an international gas portfolio through XRG, the broader re-opening of Venezuelan offshore energy to foreign capital under adjusted US sanctions rules, and Trinidad and Tobago’s need to keep its LNG infrastructure fed. This is not a standalone corporate announcement. It is a test case for whether Gulf NOC capital, Caribbean infrastructure, and US regulatory tolerance can align long enough to develop a world-scale gas resource.

Here is what the consortium structure, the resource numbers, and the regulatory context tell you about where this project is likely to go, and what still stands between a licence on paper and gas in a pipeline.

A three-way equal stake, with bp as operator

The governance structure is the first thing worth registering. bp, XRG, and UCC Oil and Gas each hold approximately one-third working interest in Loran Phase 2. No single partner holds a controlling stake, which means no single partner can force capital calls, override development timelines, or unilaterally steer governance decisions.

That matters. Most large offshore projects feature a majority operator backed by one or two minority partners who provide capital but limited strategic influence. Loran Phase 2’s flat structure distributes both risk and decision-making authority equally, a consortium model that tells you the three parties entered this arrangement as co-principals rather than lead-and-follow.

• bp: UK-headquartered international energy company. Designated as operator and licence holder. bp’s history in the region and its role as licence holder underpin the operational designation.
• XRG: ADNOC’s international energy investment company, operating across Chemicals, Gas, and Energy Solutions platforms with a strong focus on gas and LNG. Loran Phase 2 extends XRG’s international gas footprint into Latin America and the Caribbean for the first time at material scale.
• UCC Oil and Gas: The oil and gas unit of Qatar’s UCC Holding, a Qatari conglomerate. UCC’s participation adds a second source of Gulf-state capital alongside XRG.

The equal-stake arrangement has a practical implication for anyone tracking this project’s probability of reaching a final investment decision (FID, the formal commitment to build): governance disputes require negotiation among equals, not deference to a majority holder. That adds resilience against any single partner’s strategic shift, but it also means consensus is required for every major decision.

What 4 Tcf of Venezuelan gas is actually worth, and to whom

Start with the number: approximately 4 Tcf of recoverable gas sits beneath the Loran Phase 2 licence area. That is a material resource by any standard, but it is only part of the picture.

Reuters reported that the wider Loran-Manatee cross-border structure holds recoverable gas resources totalling more than 10 Tcf, placing it among the largest undeveloped accumulations in the Caribbean region.

The USGS South American and Caribbean resource assessment published in 2026 provides institutional backing for the scale of undiscovered conventional gas resources across the Plataforma Deltana region, situating the Loran-Manatee structure within a broader geological context that supports the multi-Tcf resource estimates cited in verified reporting.

Loran and Manatee are two names for different sides of the same geological structure, a gas accumulation that straddles the maritime boundary between Venezuela and Trinidad and Tobago in the Plataforma Deltana offshore area. Shell is advancing Phase 1 on the Manatee (Trinidad) side, targeting approximately 4.4 Tcf with an expected start-up around 2027. Phase 2, the bp-led consortium’s licence, targets the Venezuelan Loran side.

Shell’s offshore gas position on the Trinidad side of the Loran-Manatee structure predates the bp-led Phase 2 award, and the two developments are structurally linked: Phase 1 gas production at Manatee is the infrastructure proof of concept that Phase 2’s commercialisation plan depends upon.

The geological relationship is only half the story. The commercial logic that makes Loran Phase 2 viable rests on three pillars:

• Reserve scale: 4 Tcf within a ~10 Tcf system provides the resource base needed to justify large capital commitments and long-term offtake contracts
• Trinidad and Tobago’s LNG infrastructure: Venezuelan gas can be monetised through Trinidad’s existing liquefaction capacity, including Atlantic LNG, reaching international buyers as flexible LNG cargo rather than via pipeline
• LNG as flexible transport: Liquefied natural gas (LNG, gas cooled to liquid form for shipping) enables the project to reach a range of international markets simultaneously, offering commercial flexibility that a dedicated fixed pipeline cannot match

Without Trinidad and Tobago’s infrastructure, Venezuelan gas reserves of this scale have no near-term export path. That makes infrastructure access the single variable that converts reserves on paper into commercially viable supply.

What Venezuela and Trinidad each stand to gain

Venezuela stands to benefit from increased revenue, a revival of offshore services activity, and the recovery of operational capabilities that have eroded through prolonged underinvestment.

Trinidad and Tobago could secure additional gas volumes to feed its existing LNG plants, helping to lift throughput at facilities that have been running below nameplate capacity as domestic supply from mature fields has fallen.

The Atlantic LNG throughput shortfall that makes Venezuelan feedstock strategically attractive dates to the 2020 closure of Train 1, which removed a meaningful slice of nameplate liquefaction capacity at a time when domestic gas supply from Trinidad’s mature fields was already declining.

For XRG, the strategic value is distinct: through this licence, ADNOC’s international arm gains entry into an Atlantic basin gas corridor that connects South American reserves with Caribbean LNG infrastructure, a position absent from its international portfolio before this award.

The sanctions layer that could make or break the project

The resource is real. The infrastructure exists. The consortium is formed. None of that guarantees a single molecule of gas reaches a market.

The Loran Phase 2 licence was awarded under recently adjusted US rules and licences governing Venezuelan gas projects. That regulatory environment is both the reason international capital is re-engaging with Venezuelan offshore gas and the single largest constraint on whether the engagement produces results.

Venezuelan sanctions enforcement has reshaped the conditions under which international capital can engage with the country’s offshore resources, with OFAC authorisations now functioning as a prerequisite rather than a secondary compliance consideration for any project touching US-nexus financial systems or technology.

Three specific risk areas run through the entire project execution chain:

• OFAC licensing requirements: The Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC, the US Treasury division that administers sanctions) requires specific authorisations for US-nexus participants and activities. Any component of the project that touches US financial systems, personnel, or technology may require separate OFAC clearance.
• Dollar-denominated financing exposure: International project finance for Venezuelan assets must navigate sanctions frameworks that restrict dollar-denominated transactions, limiting the pool of available lenders and raising the cost of capital.
• Equipment supply chain constraints: Sanctions compliance affects which manufacturers, service providers, and technology suppliers can participate, potentially narrowing the field of contractors and extending procurement timelines.

The Loran Phase 2 licence award is enabled by, and remains contingent on, the current US regulatory environment. Both Phase 1 (Shell) and Phase 2 (bp/XRG/UCC) are explicitly framed in verified reporting as operating within this sanctions-dependent baseline.

Shell’s Phase 1, targeting start-up around 2027, provides a sequencing reference. If Phase 1 proceeds on schedule, it demonstrates that international operators can execute Venezuelan offshore gas projects under the current regulatory conditions. If Phase 1 encounters sanctions-related delays, the read-through for Phase 2 is immediate and negative.

For energy investors and policy watchers, the US regulatory posture is the leading indicator. Any shift in OFAC policy toward Venezuela, tightening or loosening, directly reprices the probability of this project reaching first gas.

XRG’s Latin American foothold and what the deal signals for Gulf NOC strategy

Step back from the project specifics and the pattern sharpens. XRG, ADNOC’s international energy investment vehicle, has just taken an equal-stake position in a 4 Tcf gas resource alongside bp and a Qatari partner. This is not a minority position in someone else’s project. It is a consortium-level commitment at material scale.

The three-partner geography tells its own story. UAE capital (via XRG), UK operational expertise (via bp), and Qatari investment capital (via UCC) are converging on Venezuelan offshore gas under a shared-risk model rather than any single state NOC going alone. That structure distributes political and financial exposure across three jurisdictions while pooling the operational and commercial resources needed to develop a complex offshore asset under sanctions constraints.

What each geography stands to gain from the consortium model:

• Venezuela: Fiscal revenues, a recovery of offshore services activity, and renewed access to international energy capital
• Trinidad and Tobago: Additional feedstock gas to support throughput at LNG facilities and strengthen its standing as a Caribbean energy hub
• UAE/ADNOC (via XRG): A material Atlantic basin gas position diversifying XRG’s international portfolio beyond the Middle East
• Qatar (via UCC): Exposure to Caribbean gas infrastructure and a strategic position alongside two larger international partners

The Atlantic basin logic

Loran Phase 2 gives XRG something it did not previously hold: a gas position in the Atlantic basin that connects South American reserves to Caribbean LNG infrastructure and onwards to Atlantic market buyers in Europe, Asia, and the Americas.

The Caribbean’s role as a regional LNG hub depends on projects like Loran-Manatee succeeding. Phase 2’s award alongside Phase 1’s progress toward a 2027 start-up is the clearest signal yet that the infrastructure thesis, Venezuelan gas monetised through Trinidadian LNG facilities, is being tested with real capital from credible international partners.

Whether XRG holds complementary positions elsewhere in Latin America requires separate verification and should not be assumed from this licence alone. What can be said is that the Loran Phase 2 stake positions XRG in a gas corridor that did not feature in ADNOC’s international portfolio before August 2026.

Latin American offshore gas development is accelerating beyond Venezuela, with Colombia’s deepwater sector also attracting major capital commitments in 2026, a regional trend that reinforces the Atlantic basin logic driving XRG’s entry into the Loran Phase 2 consortium.

What the Loran Phase 2 award changes, and what it does not yet resolve

The licence award confirms several things. A consortium is formed. A verified resource estimate of approximately 4 Tcf is in play. A governance structure is established with bp as operator and equal working interests across three partners. The project has a regulatory baseline under current US sanctions policy.

What remains unresolved is the distance between a licence and a producing asset.

The two variables that will determine whether this licence becomes a producing asset are the US regulatory environment and the pace at which Shell’s Phase 1 proves out the broader Loran-Manatee system. Phase 1’s targeted 2027 start-up is the nearest sequencing reference; Phase 2’s timeline will follow, not lead.

Loran Phase 2 is now a credible prospect, not yet a committed development. The gap between those two states is measured in regulatory and financial hurdles, not just engineering timelines. For investors pricing risk, the next 12-24 months of OFAC signals and Phase 1 progress will tell you more about this project’s trajectory than the licence award itself.

This article is for informational purposes only and should not be considered financial advice. Investors should conduct their own research and consult with financial professionals before making investment decisions. These statements are speculative and subject to change based on market developments and company performance.