Brent Tops $107 as BRICS Summit Opens With UAE-Iran Trade War

Brent crude settled above $107 per barrel on 10 September 2026, and the New Delhi BRICS leaders’ summit opens today with two of its own members, Iran and the UAE, locked in an active trade embargo and the echoes of ballistic missile launches still live in the Gulf.

The US-Israeli war on Iran, now six months old, has done something no external pressure managed. It has fractured BRICS from the inside. The UAE suspended all trade and financial dealings with Iran on 18 August 2026 after reported Iranian missile launches toward its territory, placing two full members of the bloc in open economic conflict days before their heads of state were scheduled to share a summit table.

Strait of Hormuz shipping transits have collapsed to as few as 7 vessels per day. The International Energy Agency (IEA) has released 400 million barrels of emergency stocks in the largest coordinated draw in its history. Goldman Sachs has flagged the possibility of oil touching $120 per barrel if vessel attacks intensify.

This piece lays out where oil prices stand and why, what the UAE-Iran rupture means for the summit’s ability to produce any agreed statement, and what the diplomatic and energy outcomes from New Delhi are likely to look like in the days ahead.

How the Hormuz shutdown pushed Brent past $100 and what the price data actually shows

The climb has been steady, not sudden, and the sequence matters.

On 9 September 2026, Brent for November delivery settled at $101.21 per barrel, its highest close since late May, while WTI for October delivery closed at $96.05. That same day, Reuters reported Iran had attacked 10 ships near the Strait of Hormuz after the US sank five Iranian oil tankers, the biggest wave of attacks by both sides since the war began in February.

The next day the market repriced hard. Brent jumped $6.42, or 6.34%, to settle at $107.63 per barrel on 10 September, and US crude topped $100 for the first time since May 2026.

By 11 September, Brent had eased slightly, quoted around $104-105 and closing near $104.61. As the summit opens today, Brent futures sit near $102.07 per barrel.

The bigger frame: Brent is up more than 60% in 2026 from early-year levels near $60-70 per barrel. This is a sustained rally, not a one-day spike.

The mechanism behind it is the chokepoint itself. Reuters data showed only 10 commodity ships transiting the strait per day on average in the 10 days to 7 September, with as few as 7 on some days.

The Hormuz tanker traffic collapse has been the mechanical driver behind every price step higher since February, with single-digit daily transit counts representing a structural supply withdrawal rather than a temporary interruption.

The UK Maritime Trade Operations agency has recorded 27 projectile strike incidents since 6 July.

Daily price ranges have exceeded $9 on key dates. For mining and energy investors, that volatility is the tell. This is not a chokepoint waiting to be reopened; it is a conflict directly repricing energy costs for every import-dependent economy watching this summit, and the single-digit transit counts suggest the structural reading is the more honest one right now.

Inside the rupture: what the UAE-Iran trade embargo means for BRICS as a functioning bloc

Two founding members of the bloc’s expanded format are now in active economic warfare, and the summit has not even formally begun.

The UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced on 18-19 August 2026, via state agency WAM, that it was halting all trade, commercial exchanges, and financial transactions with Iran until further notice. Foreign Ministry communications director Afra Al Hameli confirmed the full scope: no sector exemptions, no timetable for lifting it. Al Jazeera described it as an indefinite trade embargo.

The trigger was two ballistic missiles that Emirati authorities said were fired from Iran and splashed down in the Persian Gulf. Iran denied involvement.

The ADNOC tanker attack gave the UAE government the specific incident it cited in formal diplomatic communications as precipitating the trade embargo, and the disputed attribution of that strike remains a live point of contention between Abu Dhabi and Tehran.

The economic weight is real. Pre-war bilateral trade ran at roughly $28 billion annually, and trade routed through the UAE had underpinned Iranian imports, petroleum-product re-exports, and access to international financial networks. Iran International noted the suspension cuts one of Tehran’s key economic lifelines.

For a bloc that markets itself as an alternative pole to Western institutions, this is the harder question. A BRICS that cannot manage economic conflict between two of its own members cannot credibly coordinate on sanctions, energy security, or dollar diversification.

The May 2026 foreign ministers’ breakdown: first sign of the fault line

The fracture was visible months earlier.

At the BRICS foreign ministers’ meeting in New Delhi on 15 May 2026, Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi accused the UAE of direct involvement in military operations against Iran. His allegations were specific:

• The UAE provided military bases and facilities to the US and Israel
• The UAE granted airspace access for operations against Iran
• The UAE refused to condemn the war at its outset

The meeting ended without a joint statement. Host India issued only a chair’s statement, which explicitly acknowledged “differing views” over the war. The UAE, for its part, sought explicit condemnation of Iran, while Tehran insisted the US and Israel be named as aggressors.

That collapse was not a procedural stumble. Reuters has described the war as “splitting” BRICS membership; Al Jazeera calls it the bloc’s “deepest fault line.” The absence of a communiqué in May signalled that the consensus-based architecture had already become functionally inoperable on its most consequential current question.

What analysts say about the price ceiling and whether $102 holds or breaks higher

The forecasting range is unusually tight for a crisis of this scale, and the gap within it is where the next few days will play out.

Goldman Sachs provides the primary analytical frame. A 12 March note cited by Reuters set a base case assuming 21 days of low Hormuz flows at 10% of normal, followed by a 30-day gradual recovery, producing an average Brent price of $98 in March-April and $71 in Q4. The upside scenario, a month-long disruption, lifted the March-April average to $110 before easing to $76 by year-end.

An earlier 3 March Goldman note estimated a full one-month closure could add roughly $15 per barrel without offsets, falling to $10 or lower once spare pipeline capacity and strategic reserve releases are deployed. More recently, Goldman warned oil could rally toward $120 if vessel attacks intensify, and recommended positions in natural gas and diesel to capture fuel-specific tightness.

The scale of disruption underpins these numbers. The EIA notes Hormuz averaged roughly 20 million barrels per day in 2024, about a fifth of global petroleum liquids, with “very few alternative options” if it closes. The IEA reports flows have plunged from that level “to a trickle,” forcing Gulf producers to cut output by at least 10 million barrels per day.

IEA Executive Director Fatih Birol warned in July that global energy security would be at risk if Hormuz flows do not increase “in the next few weeks.”

There is a counterweight. The IEA expects demand to shrink by roughly 1.5 million barrels per day this quarter, and Reuters estimates Q3 demand losses of 3.5 million barrels per day, with China accounting for more than half. Saudi Arabia’s spare capacity of about 3 million barrels per day can act as a ceiling once routes normalise. Bernstein Research argues truly severe demand destruction would require an annual average nearer $155.

The read for you: the distance between Goldman’s $98 base case and its $120 upside is not a vague uncertainty band. It is the precise range within which the next few days of attack patterns and summit diplomacy will decide whether current energy and mining exposure is correctly sized.

A Hormuz deal scenario, in which Goldman revised forecasts sharply downward after a temporary de-escalation agreement, illustrates how sensitive current price levels are to any credible diplomatic signal from the summit or from direct US-Iran backchannel communications.

Can New Delhi produce a joint communiqué, and what does agreement or failure signal?

The summit’s core test is a genuine binary, and each outcome carries real weight.

The task, per Reuters’ 10 September preview, is finding language on the Middle East crisis that both Abu Dhabi and Tehran can accept. The UAE’s August trade embargo has, in Reuters’ phrasing, further complicated efforts to forge a common position, and Iran’s defiant stance as the war deepens its isolation cuts the other way.

The signals are mixed. Bloomberg reported that gaps over communiqué language had narrowed after intensive pre-summit discussions.

Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov acknowledged the differences have a “negative impact” and “get in the way of drafting a joint declaration,” while expressing hope that leaders could still find acceptable phrasing.

There is a precedent for cautious optimism. At the SCO summit in Bishkek earlier this September, members with divergent positions on the conflict still reached a joint declaration. Former Indian diplomat Rajiv Bhatia cited that as grounds for optimism. The caveat is that Bishkek did not involve an active trade embargo between two of its own members, which makes the New Delhi test structurally more acute.

The summit has drawn the leaders of China, Russia, Iran, South Africa, and Indonesia, along with the UN Secretary-General. Three outcomes are possible:

• A joint communiqué: consensus holds and the bloc cohesion narrative survives
• A chair’s statement acknowledging differences: the May precedent repeats, a functional compromise that admits the fracture
• No agreed text: open fracture and direct credibility damage

Whether New Delhi produces a communiqué will tell you more about the bloc’s real cohesion than any expansion announcement. A failed summit does not just embarrass; it limits BRICS’ practical capacity to coordinate on the very energy and sanctions pressures that drove its expansion, which weakens its credibility as a counterweight in energy markets.

What the next 72 hours will determine for oil markets and the bloc’s future

The reader now has the full picture. The question is what to watch.

A joint statement with agreed Middle East language would reduce the risk premium currently embedded in prices. A failed summit raises the probability of sustained triple-digit Brent. The communiqué outcome is therefore not just diplomacy; it is a live oil-market signal.

There is a partial floor under the disruption. India has raised non-Hormuz sourcing to roughly 70% of crude imports, per an Atlantic Council analysis, up from 55% before the conflict, and secured inventories covering 60 days of demand from 41 suppliers. Its toolkit has included excise cuts, a pump-price freeze, refinery LPG maximisation, and rationed industrial gas allocations. That large import-dependent economies are already stress-testing non-Hormuz supply chains matters for how far disruption can travel.

The three signals that will move oil prices from here

1. Hormuz attack frequency. A slowdown in strikes would ease the risk premium quickly; intensification is Goldman’s condition for the $120 scenario.
2. The summit communiqué outcome. Agreed Middle East language points toward de-escalation and softer prices; no agreed text signals sustained triple-digit Brent.
3. The UAE-Iran embargo trajectory. Holding at current scope is neutral; any escalation deepens the intra-bloc fracture and the regional risk premium.

The most useful historical anchor is Abqaiq in 2019. Brent jumped roughly 15% in a day after attacks on Saudi facilities, then returned to pre-attack levels within weeks once production was restored and producers coordinated. Even severe infrastructure attacks do not guarantee sustained high prices where spare capacity and repair capabilities exist.

Geopolitical energy market volatility in 2026 differs from prior crisis episodes in one structural respect: the chokepoint under pressure carries roughly a fifth of global petroleum liquids, with no rapid substitution route available at scale, which distinguishes it from the single-facility attacks that characterised earlier disruption events.

The current spike is more structural, hitting a transport chokepoint rather than a single processing hub. But the lesson holds: this is reversible if the physical supply picture improves. Investors with energy and mining exposure are not waiting for a trend; they are waiting for signals. These three are the ones worth tracking.

This article is for informational purposes only and should not be considered financial advice. Investors should conduct their own research and consult with financial professionals before making investment decisions.

Past performance does not guarantee future results. Financial projections are subject to market conditions and various risk factors. These statements are speculative and subject to change based on market developments.