ACG Metals Buys Keşkek Gold Project for US$7.85M

ACG Metals has signed a binding agreement to acquire the Keşkek gold project in Türkiye for up to US$7.85 million, buying itself a fresh oxide ore source at the precise moment its existing pits run dry.

The timing is deliberate. As ACG pivots its flagship Gediktepe mine away from oxide gold and toward copper and zinc concentrate production, the heap-leach infrastructure that has generated its gold cash flow faces years of underutilisation. Keşkek, sitting roughly 70 km away, offers a way to keep that facility fed.

The acquisition also lands in a Türkiye that has recently rewritten its mining rulebook, with new permitting frameworks and national gold output targets reshaping both the opportunity and the hazards attached to it.

Here is what ACG is actually buying, what the phased payment terms reveal about its own confidence in execution, and where the real risks sit before the company spends its first dollar at Keşkek.

What ACG is buying: deal terms and the asset itself

The transaction is built in two tranches, and the order tells you where ACG has placed its bets.

The first payment is US$4.0 million in cash, due once the General Directorate of Mining and Petroleum Affairs (MAPEG) approves the transfer of the mining licence. ACG expects that approval around October 2026.

The second tranche is up to US$3.85 million, roughly 49% of the total consideration, and it is contingent on the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) permitting process concluding, expected by mid-2027.

That structure is the story. By gating nearly half the price behind an EIA milestone, ACG has arranged its maximum cash outlay to track permitting risk rather than asset risk. That distinction matters for how much weight you assign the headline US$7.85 million figure: the full cost is conditional on a process with a historically variable timeline in Türkiye.

The asset behind the price

The licence itself (mining licence 60926) spans 666 hectares and was acquired from Turkish nickel and cobalt processor Meta Nikel Kobalt Madencilik Sanayi ve Ticaret A.Ş. ACG’s technical team estimates an indicated mineral resource of approximately 1.5 million tonnes grading 0.65 g/t gold, with further exploration potential across the licence.

Two ongoing obligations come attached. Meta Nikel retains a 1% gross revenue royalty on all gold extracted within the licence boundary. ACG will also pay an additional US$60 per ounce on any gold converted to ore reserves beyond the currently defined Keşkek pit, meaning the seller keeps a stake in exploration success.

Across a ten-year horizon, ACG estimates combined project expenditure, spanning the acquisition, exploration, development and eventual closure, at roughly US$15 million.

How Keşkek fits into the Gediktepe transition strategy

Before Keşkek makes sense as a solution, the problem it solves needs stating plainly: Gediktepe’s oxide pits are running out.

In FY 2025, the operation produced 39.2 koz of gold-equivalent (AuEq) from 354,472 tonnes of ore, beating upgraded guidance of 36-38 koz but landing roughly 29% below 2024 as the primary oxide pits matured. The decline is not a stumble; it is the mine ageing on schedule.

The transition became active on 31 August 2026, when the new flotation circuit produced its first copper concentrate, with commercial production targeted by the end of 2026. Gediktepe is now moving from an oxide gold and silver operation into a copper and zinc concentrate producer.

The Gediktepe sulphide expansion reached a concrete milestone on 31 August 2026, when the flotation circuit produced its first copper concentrate, with commercial production targeted by year end.

That shift creates a gap. The heap-leach facility that generated ACG’s gold cash flow would sit idle during the exact window when the company needs that cash flow most, to fund the sulphide ramp-up.

Keşkek fills it. Rather than requiring greenfield spending, the asset feeds existing Gediktepe infrastructure: the contractors, haul roads and processing facilities already in place. It extends the heap-leach facility’s productive life by several years.

The metallurgical fit reduces the technical uncertainty. A July 2026 technical release confirmed ACG’s proprietary recovery process had lifted commercial gold recoveries at Gediktepe from around 75% to around 85%. ACG expects the same process to lift Keşkek’s baseline heap-leach recoveries of 75-80% to approximately 85%.

The proprietary process delivers three attributed benefits when applied to compatible oxide ore:

• Higher gold recovery, from roughly 75% to around 85%
• Approximately 45% lower cyanide consumption
• Shorter leach cycles and lower operating costs

That recovery uplift tells you ACG is not importing a standalone processing challenge. It is applying a proven method to a compatible ore type, which lowers the technical risk relative to a conventional satellite acquisition.

ACG chief executive Artem Volynets has stated the Keşkek acquisition allows the company to continue primary gold output alongside copper and zinc concentrates, sustaining cash flow while the sulphide expansion reaches commercial production.

Permitting exposure and the risks embedded in the deal structure

The EIA gate is meant to do something specific for ACG: cap its cash exposure until permitting clears. On paper, Türkiye’s reforms make that gate look fast.

In July 2025, the government introduced Law No. 7554, updating the Mining Law. The reforms brought digitalisation, cost-free pre-permission periods, and a three-month statutory approval window. Officials tied the changes to national targets of pushing domestic gold output to 50-60 tonnes annually from 2026, positioning gold as a priority commodity under Group IV of the Mining Law.

Then the historical record intervenes.

Documented EIA approval timelines in Türkiye have stretched from 3 to 34 months, and roughly 16% of mining-related applications have historically failed to obtain approval at all.

That spread is the point. A three-month statutory target sitting against a 34-month documented maximum tells you the mid-2027 timeline ACG has set for the contingent payment is optimistic relative to the historical distribution. Treat it as a target, not a schedule.

Environmental assessment decisions in mining projects are rarely linear, and the Keşkek EIA sits within a broader pattern where statutory timelines and actual outcomes routinely diverge across jurisdictions, with community, regulatory, and procedural factors each capable of extending or collapsing an approval window.

Approval is also not irrevocable. In the Çöpler context, the Turkish government revoked environmental permits following a site incident, and the Council of State upheld the cancellation of that mine’s 2021 EIA in 2025. Permits granted can be permits withdrawn.

The 2025 legal updates add compliance weight too, mandating new rehabilitation fees equal to operating licence fees and empowering MAPEG to suspend production where obligations are not met.

For you as an investor, the EIA gate protects ACG’s maximum cash outlay, but it cuts both ways. Production at Keşkek could slip well beyond mid-2027 without triggering any default on the deal, creating a timing risk for the very cash flow ACG is counting on during the sulphide ramp-up.

How Keşkek’s royalty terms compare, and what the US$60/oz clause signals

Start with the royalty in isolation: a 1% gross revenue royalty retained by Meta Nikel. On its own the figure means little. Placed against the Turkish market, it looks unusually clean.

Royalty structures in mining vary considerably in how they allocate upside between project operators and royalty holders, with gross revenue royalties, net smelter returns, and net profit interests each carrying different risk-sharing profiles that affect a project’s cost structure across commodity price cycles.

Consider the comparables. SSR Mining’s 2026 exit from the Hod Maden project converted a 20% equity stake into an uncapped 4.0% net smelter return (NSR) royalty, with partner Royal Gold holding a further 2.5% NSR. SSR’s own disclosures note that statutory Turkish state royalties average around 12.8% over a mine’s life at consensus prices.

Globally, London-listed Oriole Resources PLC structures its junior royalties at 1.5% NSR on precious metals, placing ACG’s 1% at the lower end of the London-listed junior spectrum.

A 1% GRR in a jurisdiction where statutory royalties alone average 12.8% tells you ACG negotiated an unusually light royalty burden. That is a material positive for the project’s cost structure.

The US$60 per ounce discovery clause is the trade-off that made it possible. It applies only to gold converted to reserves beyond the current pit boundary, meaning Meta Nikel keeps meaningful exposure to exploration upside without demanding a higher headline royalty or a larger upfront price.

For you, that clause adds a variable cost to future exploration success, but it caps the seller’s participation at a predictable per-ounce rate rather than an open-ended slice of revenue.

What ACG needs to deliver for Keşkek to earn its place

The announcement is the easy part. Execution now runs through three sequential gates, each a prerequisite for the next.

1. MAPEG licence transfer approval, targeted around October 2026
2. EIA permitting approval, targeted mid-2027
3. Production commencement, targeted mid-2027

No gate opens until the previous one clears. That sequencing is why Keşkek’s production contribution should be read as upside to the copper transition cash flow picture, not a guaranteed component of it.

The logistics test at 70 km

Trucking oxide ore 70 km to Gediktepe’s heap-leach facility works only if the economics hold. At Keşkek’s indicated grade of 0.65 g/t gold, that viability depends on strip ratios, haulage costs and recovery rates performing within the parameters set by technical studies.

Extra haul distance raises the crossover grade at which heap-leaching stays profitable. If Keşkek’s grade or strip ratio underperforms, the 70 km trip can turn uneconomic quickly. Metallurgical compatibility matters too, since differing clay content or deleterious elements could affect how the ore leaches on the existing pad.

Set against ACG’s wider ambition, Keşkek’s role is explicit. The company is targeting 200,000-300,000 tonnes of copper production within five years and a market capitalisation of US$3-5 billion, up from roughly US$344 million at the end of 2025. Against that, and a ten-year Keşkek spend of around US$15 million, this is a bridge asset, not a primary growth driver.

The ACG copper growth ambition, anchored to targets of 200,000-300,000 tonnes of production within five years, sits against a supply-demand backdrop where price and volume assumptions will ultimately determine whether that capitalisation target is reachable.

That framing matters for how you value it. Keşkek’s worth lies in what it protects, heap-leach utilisation and gold cash flow through the transition, rather than what it adds as a standalone project.

What the Keşkek acquisition does and does not change for ACG

The deal resolves a real operational problem. It hands ACG a credible oxide feed to keep the Gediktepe heap-leach facility running through the flotation ramp-up, it carries a light royalty burden by Turkish standards, and it is structured so the company’s maximum cash outlay tracks permitting success rather than preceding it.

What it does not resolve is timing. Production hinges on a permitting process with a documented range of 3 to 34 months, and the logistics economics still depend on Keşkek’s ore performing to grade and strip assumptions across a 70 km haul.

Nor does it change the core thesis. Keşkek supports gold cash flow during the transition; it does not alter ACG’s primary copper growth ambition or its US$3-5 billion capitalisation target.

Three variables are worth watching before assigning Keşkek any weight in an ACG thesis:

• The MAPEG licence transfer decision, targeted October 2026
• The EIA permitting outcome, targeted mid-2027
• Early metallurgical data confirming compatibility with Gediktepe’s existing leach pad

The first answer, the MAPEG decision, should not be long in coming. Until then, the deal reads as strategically coherent and financially conservative, with a contribution to ACG’s 2027 operating profile that depends on execution in a regulatory environment where timelines remain a known variable rather than a fixed input.

This article is for informational purposes only and should not be considered financial advice. Investors should conduct their own research and consult with financial professionals before making investment decisions. Forward-looking statements regarding permitting timelines, production targets, and cost estimates are speculative and subject to change based on market developments and company performance.