Thorizon and Urenco Sign MoU to Explore Uranium Enrichment Supply
Key Takeaways
- Thorizon and Urenco signed a non-binding MoU on 8 October 2026 covering enrichment, HALEU and depleted uranium reuse, with no contract, quantity, price or final investment decision attached.
- Rosatom holds 29.810 million SWU a year of enrichment capacity against Urenco's 18.000 million, out of 77.784 million globally, so the tightest constraint sits in the midstream, not the mine.
- The WNA estimates reactors needed about 68,920 tU in 2025 against roughly 60,000 tU mined, with requirements potentially passing 150,000 tU by 2040.
- Western capacity is building: Urenco USA is adding 700,000 SWU/yr by spring 2027, Orano is expanding by 2.5 million SWU by 2028, and Centrus has a $900 million task order targeting 12 tonnes of HALEU a year from 2029.
- Thorizon One, a planned 100 MWe reactor at Borssele targeted for 2034, makes this the earliest-stage deal among comparable HALEU agreements, with Capenhurst HALEU expected from 2031 as a potential fuel route.
Thorizon and Urenco signed a non-binding memorandum of understanding on 8 October 2026 to explore uranium enrichment, high-assay low-enriched uranium and the reuse of depleted uranium for molten salt reactors. No contract, quantity or price sits behind it yet.
The timing still matters. Mines are producing less uranium than the world’s reactors consume, and the harder constraint is increasingly found in the midstream plants that turn raw uranium into usable fuel.
Here is what the agreement changes, what it leaves untouched, and where opportunity and risk sit from the mine to the enrichment plant to the advanced fuel developer.
What the Thorizon and Urenco MoU actually covers (and what it leaves open)
The framework spans three areas: enrichment supply, high-assay low-enriched uranium (HALEU) supply options, and possible use of depleted uranium. HALEU is uranium enriched to 5-20% uranium-235. Depleted uranium is the by-product of enrichment and is mostly uranium-238.
Two questions drive the work: whether Urenco is able to provide Thorizon with enriched uranium, and whether depleted uranium could serve as feedstock in Thorizon’s future reactors. The target customer is Thorizon One, a planned 100 MWe reactor at Borssele in the Netherlands, with first delivery targeted for 2034. Urenco’s Capenhurst facility in the UK is expected to produce HALEU from 2031, a potential fuel route.
Urenco’s view Laurent Odeh, Chief Commercial Officer, said Thorizon’s technology opens an opportunity to use HALEU “in a different form”.
Then come the gaps. The MoU does not establish:
- a binding fuel-supply contract
- any confirmed quantity or price
- a licensed depleted-uranium fuel process
- a final investment decision
For you, this signals customer alignment and early engineering intent, not secured fuel or revenue for either company.
Can depleted uranium really fuel a molten salt reactor?
In principle, a fast or epithermal design can absorb neutrons into uranium-238, convert it into plutonium-239, then split that new fuel. A thermal-spectrum reactor generally cannot run on depleted uranium alone, and salt chemistry, fuel qualification, waste handling and regulatory approval all remain unproven.
Why the uranium supply gap is really an enrichment story
The mine gap
The headline shortfall is familiar. The World Nuclear Association (WNA) estimates reactors needed about 68,920 tU (tonnes of uranium) in 2025 against roughly 60,000 tU mined, with requirements potentially passing 150,000 tU by 2040.
| Metric | WNA-based figure | Red Book figure |
|---|---|---|
| Annual reactor requirement | 68,920 tU (2025) | ~64,500 tU |
| Mine production | ~60,000 tU | 61,924 tU (2024) |
| Forward warning | Above 150,000 tU by 2040 | Possible shortfall around 2027 (high demand) |
The sources use different reference years, but both put demand above mine output. Spot uranium ended September near $89.63/lb, with term prices around $96.50/lb.
The midstream constraint
The tighter squeeze sits further down the chain. Rosatom holds 29.810 million separative work units (SWU, the measure of enrichment effort) a year of capacity against Urenco’s 18.000 million, out of 77.784 million shown globally.
Rosatom’s lead in enrichment capacity explains why the global dependence on Russian uranium remains so difficult to unwind, since replacement plants take years to build and licence even when funding is available.
The harder rebuild Westinghouse’s Frédéric Fragman said uranium supply is manageable; the more serious task is rebuilding Western enrichment and conversion capacity.
The Canadian Mining Journal adds that conversion and enrichment must grow together. US utilities paid an average $108.70/SWU in 2025 (EIA), while spot and market estimates sit near $190-$200, though contract averages and spot figures are not directly comparable.
Only Russia and China produce HALEU at scale, according to the WNA in February 2026. The Western response is building:
- Urenco USA: sixth of eight new cascades started 8 October 2026; 700,000 SWU/yr expansion completing spring 2027; a further 2.1 million SWU/yr from 2032 to 2036
- US ban on Russian uranium imports signed 13 May 2024, with waivers ending by 1 January 2028
- Centrus: $900 million task order targeting 12 tonnes of HALEU a year, first capacity in 2029
- Orano: 2.5 million SWU expansion by 2028
More mined uranium alone will not ease fuel tightness, so enrichment and conversion deserve as much of your attention as miners.
Where the opportunities and risks sit across the fuel cycle
Lined up against comparable deals, the Thorizon agreement looks like the earliest-stage example:
- X-energy/TRISO-X: $148 million DOE award (April 2024); next-phase contract signed
- TerraPower/Centrus: MoU, 17 July 2026; cooperation only
- Oklo/Centrus: MoU, 28 August 2026; construction and regulatory risk remain
- Kairos, TerraPower, Radiant, TRISO-X, Westinghouse: DOE HALEU allocations (April 2026)
The pattern is consistent. Developers secure access while governments subsidise, but none of this proves fuel qualification, pricing or deployment.
| Risk | Miners | Enrichers | Advanced fuel developers |
|---|---|---|---|
| Non-binding demand | May never become firm orders | No guaranteed SWU or HALEU revenue | No assured fuel, price or delivery date |
| Licensing delay | Permitting takes years | Nuclear, export and safeguards approvals | Reactor, fuel and waste licences out of sync |
| Policy dependence | Relies on support and permitting | Expansion heavily policy-backed | DOE awards and tax credits central |
| Russian return | Possible price shock | Supply could return after contracts signed | May still pay a temporary premium |
| Fuel-cycle mismatch | More ore does not fix enrichment | More SWU does not fix conversion | Reactor ready, fuel not qualified |
The Carnegie Endowment flagged high plant costs, no mature market, limited reactor demand and evolving safeguards on 8 October 2026. Read MoUs as a map of where policy and capital are flowing, then weigh each holding against the specific risk attached to its link.
For readers wanting the governance angle, our detailed coverage of HALEU supply chain gaps examines where federal oversight of the fuel pipeline falls short.
What to watch next, and what would change the picture
The MoU is a small signal inside a larger story about rebuilding Western enrichment and HALEU capacity. Four markers would show whether that story is firming:
- A binding Thorizon-Urenco agreement with quantities and price
- Capenhurst staying on track for HALEU in 2031
- Urenco USA’s final cascade in spring 2027
- US Russian-import waivers expiring by 1 January 2028
Until those land, the deciding question is whether a given announcement moves fuel, or simply moves position.
This article is for informational purposes only and should not be considered financial advice. Investors should conduct their own research and consult with financial professionals before making investment decisions. Forward-looking statements are speculative and subject to change.
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Frequently Asked Questions
What is HALEU and why does it matter for advanced reactors?
HALEU is high-assay low-enriched uranium, enriched to 5-20% uranium-235. Many advanced reactor designs need it, yet only Russia and China produce it at scale, which makes Western HALEU capacity a strategic gap.
What does a non-binding MoU mean for uranium enrichment deals?
A non-binding MoU signals alignment and early engineering intent, not secured supply. The Thorizon and Urenco agreement sets no contract, quantity, price or final investment decision, so neither company has locked in fuel or revenue.
Is uranium enrichment a bigger constraint than uranium mining?
Increasingly, yes. Mines produce less than reactors consume, but Rosatom holds 29.810 million SWU a year of the 77.784 million global total, and replacement Western plants take years to build and licence.
Can depleted uranium fuel a molten salt reactor?
In principle a fast or epithermal design can convert uranium-238 into plutonium-239 and burn it. A thermal-spectrum reactor generally cannot run on depleted uranium alone, and salt chemistry, fuel qualification and regulatory approval remain unproven.
What milestones should investors watch after the Thorizon and Urenco MoU?
Four markers matter: a binding Thorizon-Urenco agreement with quantities and price, Capenhurst producing HALEU in 2031, Urenco USA's final cascade in spring 2027, and US Russian-import waivers ending by 1 January 2028.

