DISA Uranium Raises $105M to Turn Uranium Waste Into US Supply

On 19 August 2026, a new uranium company closed its formation with US$105 million in the bank and a mandate to process something the industry has spent decades treating as a problem: roughly 15,000 low-grade uranium waste piles scattered across the Four Corners region and Wyoming.

That company is DISA Uranium, the product of a corporate combination between IsoEnergy (NYSE American: ISOU; TSX: ISO) and DISA Technologies. The deal fuses IsoEnergy’s permitted Utah conventional mines with a proprietary mobile processing technology and the only US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) license of its kind for multi-site uranium remediation. The timing is not incidental: uranium supply security is a live US policy concern in 2026, which makes a domestic remediation-to-supply play immediately relevant to anyone tracking the nuclear fuel chain.

US uranium supply security has become a live policy priority in 2026, with geopolitical pressure on foreign supply chains accelerating demand for domestic production routes that do not depend on new greenfield mine development.

What follows explains what DISA Uranium actually is, how its technology works, who backed it and at what implied valuation, and what the 2026 pilot projects are designed to prove. Read it as a briefing on a company that has attracted serious capital before producing a single pound of uranium.

A US$105 million bet on uranium waste no one else wanted

Start with the money, and the names attached to it. The US$105 million private placement that closed alongside the corporate combination on 19 August 2026 was led by Tembo Capital, with a co-investor list that reads like a cross-section of industrial and climate finance:

• BHP Ventures
• Galvanize Climate Solutions
• Valor Equity Partners
• Evok Innovations
• Halliburton Labs
• Veriten

That roster is worth sitting with before you look at the feedstock. The presence of BHP Ventures and Halliburton Labs alongside climate-focused funds signals that sophisticated capital is not reading this as a pure uranium trade. It is being read as a convergence of remediation services, domestic supply, and industrial technology. The backers are betting on a business model as much as a commodity.

IsoEnergy sits at the centre of that model in two roles at once. It is the strategic sponsor, contributing its Utah Portfolio of permitted mines, and it is an investor, committing US$33 million of the financing round. Following the close, IsoEnergy holds approximately 33% of DISA Uranium on a fully diluted basis, making it the single largest shareholder, with board representation through its chairman and CEO.

DISA Uranium is described in IsoEnergy’s own communications as “a new technology-enabled U.S. uranium company positioned to strengthen domestic uranium supply and support the growing demand for secure, U.S.-sourced nuclear fuel.”

According to Crux Investor coverage dated 25 September 2026, the financing implies a pro forma fully diluted equity value of approximately US$505 million for DISA Uranium. That figure has not been independently confirmed. Still, it gives you a market-derived price on this new entity before it has produced anything, and for investors tracking the domestic fuel chain, the backer list is arguably as informative as the number itself.

What DISA Technologies brings that money alone cannot buy

Capital funds a business. It does not create the right to operate one. That distinction is where DISA Technologies earns its place in this combination, because what it contributed cannot be bought at any price on short notice.

The license

DISA Technologies brought three things: the high-pressure slurry ablation (HPSA) technology, its remediation and recovery business, and NRC source material license SUA-1605. The license is the piece that matters most.

Issued on 30 September 2025 under Docket No. 40-38417, SUA-1605 is a multi-site service-provider license. That phrase carries real weight. Instead of authorising a single fixed facility, it permits DISA to deploy its HPSA technology in the field, moving from one abandoned mine site to the next. IsoEnergy and DISA Uranium describe it as the only NRC license of its kind.

The NRC source material license SUA-1605, issued 30 September 2025 under Docket No. 40-38417, authorises DISA to remediate abandoned uranium mine waste across private, state, federal public lands, and federal tribal lands, with a demobilisation requirement after each site treatment that confirms its mobile operational model.

There is a rhythm to how it works. Before mobilising to each new site, DISA must file a pre-mobilisation notification with the NRC. A draft notification already references Mesa County, Colorado as an early deployment site. That requirement establishes regulatory cadence and, importantly, limits how fast the company can move from one site to the next.

Here is why the license is the structural moat rather than a formality. A multi-site mobile NRC license with no known equivalent in the US uranium industry is a genuine barrier to entry. Any competitor wanting to replicate this model would need to obtain a comparable license from scratch, and you should weigh that time cost against DISA’s current head start. The license is the operating permission that makes the entire waste-pile strategy legally executable at scale, which is precisely why DISA Technologies was a necessary partner, not simply a technology vendor.

The assets contributed

IsoEnergy’s half of the combination is more conventional. It contributed its Utah Portfolio of permitted, past-producing conventional uranium mines and projects:

• Tony M Mine
• Daneros Mine
• Rim Mine
• Sage Plain Project
• Flatiron Project

These assets form the production anchor. IsoEnergy characterises them as a scaled conventional resource base sitting alongside the remediation business, giving DISA Uranium a near-term production pathway distinct from the longer-dated waste-pile thesis.

The Flatiron Project drilling campaign provides a more granular look at the exploration status of one of the Utah Portfolio assets now contributed to DISA Uranium, with 2026 results shaping the resource picture that underpins the conventional mine side of the business.

That near-term pathway has a defined timeline. A Preliminary Economic Assessment (PEA) for the Tony M Mine is targeted by year-end 2026, with potential restart cash flow commencing in 2027. For investors, that positions the Utah mines as the nearest thing to a conventional catalyst in an otherwise unconventional company.

15,000 waste piles and what it takes to process them

The scale of the opportunity is the headline, and it is genuinely large. Across the Four Corners region and into Wyoming, approximately 15,000 uranium mine waste piles have been catalogued, representing sites that prior operators left behind. For the parties who now hold responsibility for them, each pile sits in one of two categories: an ongoing environmental burden with associated cleanup obligations, or a body of contained uranium that current economics have so far made impractical to recover.

Uranium legacy site remediation has historically been managed as an environmental compliance obligation rather than a value-recovery opportunity, a framing that DISA’s mobile processing approach is explicitly designed to challenge.

The EPA’s Uranium Location Database catalogues approximately 15,000 mine locations with known or potential uranium occurrence across 14 western states, with roughly 75 percent of those sites on federal and tribal lands concentrated in Colorado, Utah, New Mexico, Arizona, and Wyoming.

The physical reality of processing them is where ambition meets operational complexity. HPSA is a physical pre-concentration process, and it runs in a defined sequence at each pile:

1. Waste pile material is turned into a slurry.
2. That slurry is subjected to high-pressure mechanical ablation, disaggregating the particles.
3. The material is separated into a uranium-bearing concentrate and a cleaner residual fraction.
4. The concentrate is forwarded to a mill for further processing.
5. The cleaner remaining rock is left in place on the site.

Then comes the grade reality, which is the part most investors will find counterintuitive. Remediation material runs below 0.1% uranium. IsoEnergy CEO Phil Williams has characterised that as the lower end of HPSA’s effective recovery range. On its face, sub-0.1% is not a grade you would associate with an economic mining operation.

Pre-concentration is what changes that arithmetic. Because HPSA works on material that has already been mined and moved, the cost of digging and hauling has largely been spent by a previous operator. The incremental cost sits in processing, not new mine development. By mechanically liberating the uranium and concentrating it out of a large volume of low-grade material, HPSA raises the effective grade sent to a mill, which is how recovery can become viable even when the bulk grade is below conventional thresholds.

Access is negotiated pile by pile, because ownership varies. Counterparties include the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), private landholders, and other uranium companies, and they typically receive a modest royalty on recovered uranium. Two initial remediation projects are scheduled for 2026 to determine processing speed and sequencing. Those pilots are not symbolic; they will generate the operational data that either validates or challenges the whole waste-pile thesis, which makes them the most important near-term data points for anyone tracking this company.

Where the thesis goes from here: pilots, a PEA, and a potential new mill

The company is running four timelines at once, and seeing them in sequence is the clearest way to understand what to watch. Laid out chronologically:

1. 2026: Two pilot remediation projects, generating processing-speed and sequencing data.
2. Year-end 2026: The Tony M PEA, testing the conventional mine economics.
3. 2027: A potential Tony M restart, with cash flow possible if a restart decision proceeds.
4. Longer-dated: Development of a new centralised uranium processing facility.

That fourth milestone is the one signalling scale. DISA Uranium intends to build a new centralised uranium processing and recycling facility anchored by the size of the Utah Portfolio rather than constructed speculatively. Notably, IsoEnergy had previously explored acquiring an existing mill located roughly 3 miles from Tony M; the new entity intends to develop its own facility instead.

A new centralised facility would be the first conventional uranium mill constructed in the United States in over four decades.

The technology does not strictly depend on that mill being built. HPSA can also be deployed alongside an existing nearby mill, since reducing waste input lowers both mill tonnage and tailings volume regardless of mill proximity. That flexibility gives management more than one route to processing capacity.

For investors, the point is to keep these timelines distinct rather than treating them as equivalent near-term catalysts. The 2027 cash-flow potential from Tony M is the nearest anchor in an otherwise pre-revenue company, and both the remediation pilots and the PEA are scheduled to report before year-end 2026. Each timeline carries a different risk profile and speaks to a different investor audience, and holding them apart is what lets you form a grounded view of the company.

What DISA Uranium changes about how the industry reads legacy waste

Pull the corporate, regulatory, and technological threads together and a single idea emerges: DISA Uranium is an attempt to reclassify legacy uranium waste from environmental liability into domestic feedstock. Whether that reclassification holds depends entirely on the 2026 pilots proving the processing economics work at sub-0.1% grades.

The remediation supply thesis

The policy backdrop gives the thesis its urgency. US demand for secure, domestically sourced nuclear fuel is growing as nuclear generation expands and geopolitical risk around foreign uranium supply intensifies. DISA Uranium is positioned as one of the few entities holding both the technology and the license to address roughly 15,000 legacy sites systematically, with counterparty diversity across the EPA, private landholders, and corporate owners requiring individual access negotiations at each one.

Domestic uranium production has been recovering through 2025 and into 2026, but the volume recovery remains well below levels needed to offset the geopolitical risk premium embedded in contracted supply agreements, which is the gap the DISA remediation model is designed to partially address.

The US$505 million implied pro forma equity value (per Crux Investor, 25 September 2026, and not independently confirmed) is the market’s current pricing of these variables. It is worth being clear-eyed about what that number represents: a bet on regulatory uniqueness and technology economics before either has been proven at commercial scale. NRC license SUA-1605 remains the only multi-site mobile remediation license of its kind in the US uranium sector, and that scarcity is doing a lot of the work in the valuation.

For context on how unusual this asset base is, consider IsoEnergy’s other flagship. Its Hurricane deposit in Saskatchewan’s Athabasca Basin holds what is described as the world’s highest-grade indicated uranium resource, sitting at the opposite end of the grade spectrum from Utah and the remediation material. One company now spans the extremes of uranium grade, from the richest ore to sub-economic waste piles.

The three variables to watch before year-end 2026

• Pilot processing results: the speed and sequencing data from the two 2026 projects, which will show whether HPSA economics hold in the field.
• Tony M PEA economics: the year-end assessment that tests whether the conventional mine restart pathway is financially sound.
• Mill progress: any movement on permitting or site selection for the new centralised facility, signalling whether the scale ambition is advancing.

The read for investors is straightforward. DISA Uranium introduces an asset class that was previously absent from the US nuclear fuel supply chain: mobile remediation as a route to domestic uranium production. Whether that class is investable rests on what the 2026 pilots show.

This article is for informational purposes only and should not be considered financial advice. Investors should conduct their own research and consult with financial professionals before making investment decisions. Past performance does not guarantee future results, and financial projections are subject to market conditions and various risk factors. Forward-looking statements regarding pilots, the PEA, restart timing, and mill development are speculative and subject to change based on market developments and company performance.