Iran’s Crude Exports Hit Zero, but LPG and Jet Fuel Still Leak Out

Iran’s crude exports have fallen to zero, yet at least eight gas tankers and one jet fuel cargo appear to have slipped past a US naval blockade that officials describe as airtight. The advocacy group United Against Nuclear Iran (UANI) estimates the liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) on those tankers at about 4.1 million barrels. Over the same period, Kpler recorded zero Iranian crude loadings in September 2026.

That gap between crude and refined products is the story. US Central Command (CENTCOM) reimposed the blockade on 14 July 2026. Asian jet fuel prices have more than doubled since the Iran war began. Reuters disclosed both the cargoes and the method used to hide them on 16 October.

For energy investors, it matters whether the blockade works or whether it is perfect, and the two are easy to confuse. This piece sets out where the evidence on Iran’s LPG and jet fuel exports is strong and where it is thin. It also explains what the leakage tells you about Gulf flows and Asian product markets.

What the tracking evidence shows about Iranian LPG and jet fuel cargoes

The evidence comes from a few vessels, tracked one at a time. Read in sequence, they show a pattern.

LPG cargoes

UANI combines ship tracking with satellite observation. It identified at least eight gas tankers carrying Iranian LPG out of the Gulf of Oman since mid-July.

• Vessel count: at least 8 gas tankers
• Volume: about 4.1 million barrels, an analyst estimate rather than a customs or bill-of-lading total
• Route: transfers near the Omani towns of Shinas and Sohar, or waiting in the Gulf of Oman before crossing the blockade line
• Onward leg: further transfers at Malaysia’s Eastern Outer Port Limits (OPL), an offshore zone used for transshipment
• Likely destination: China, according to UANI

Four maritime security sources who monitor Gulf oil flows told Reuters that Iran has hidden these cargoes among a growing number of ship-to-ship (STS) transfers by other Gulf producers off Oman.

Iranian LPG supply routes toward China have long relied on indirect logistics, and the estimated 4.1 million barrels fits that pattern of opportunistic movement rather than a restored export channel.

The jet fuel cargo to Myanmar

SynMax satellite imagery identified a tanker carrying Iranian jet fuel that reached Myanmar in September. Its volume was not reported. Washington has sanctioned Myanmar’s jet fuel sector since 2023.

Torbjorn Soltvedt of Verisk Maplecroft said economic strain could push Iran toward taking bigger risks. He added that jet fuel is an attractive product to move, given grounded aircraft and possible refinery surpluses.

The vessels involved share a common profile. A Reuters review of Treasury records found that seven of them (six gas tankers and the jet fuel tanker) were already under US sanctions. UANI senior research analyst Jemima Shelley described the shipments as opportunistic rather than a new strategy.

Shelley’s assessment Only a handful of LPG tankers made it through, according to Shelley, while US forces redirected most tankers carrying Iranian products.

The read for you is that product cargoes can move in small, deniable batches even when crude cannot. That is a signal about how the blockade is designed. It is not proof that Iranian supply has returned.

How ship-to-ship transfers off Oman and Malaysia hide a cargo’s origin

The concealment rests on a simple fact: a cargo can be moved from one ship to another at sea. Each transfer makes it harder to connect where the cargo came from with where it ends up.

The four-step transfer chain

1. An Iranian vessel loads or receives product near Iran or Oman.
2. The cargo moves to another vessel near Shinas, Sohar or elsewhere in the Gulf of Oman.
3. The receiving ship mixes in with a much larger volume of legitimate Gulf product transfers.
4. A further transfer at Malaysia’s Eastern OPL hides the original vessel before the cargo heads toward China or another Asian buyer.

Each step separates one link in the chain: the cargo’s origin, the identity of the vessel and its final destination. By the fourth hand-off, investigators need to show that a specific cargo crossed a specific line, and the paperwork rarely does that.

STS transfers and offshore limit areas are normal tools of the trade. Sanctions risk arises when the pattern of transfers hides origin. A 2025 Treasury maritime advisory lists STS transfers, nighttime operations and missing or altered automatic identification system (AIS) signals as warning signs. AIS is the transponder system ships use to broadcast their position and identity. The advisory also notes that these chains depend on “clean” non-sanctioned vessels to make the final delivery.

Who carries the risk

• Enforcement: investigators must match AIS data, satellite imagery, ownership records, cargo histories and port calls instead of trusting a ship’s declared identity.
• Insurers and banks: poorly documented transfers create sanctions, ownership, cargo-origin and seaworthiness exposure.
• Gulf producers: counterparties, ports and traders face reputational damage even when their own cargo is lawful.
• Malaysia and China-linked trade: the Eastern OPL becomes a risk area for transshipment and relabelling.

If you hold shipping, trading or insurance exposure, a cargo that looks lawful when it reaches Asia may still carry hidden sanctions risk. The documentation is weakest at the transfer points.

Is the blockade airtight? Weighing UANI and SynMax against CENTCOM and Treasury

Both sides of this argument have real evidence. Once you look closely, they turn out to be answering different questions.

The July reimposition shifted the question from whether a blockade exists to how blockade enforcement is applied vessel by vessel, which helps explain why crude is shut while small product cargoes still find gaps.

The case for leakage

UANI’s vessel histories, SynMax’s imagery of the Myanmar cargo and the accounts from four Gulf maritime sources all point the same way. Small product cargoes are moving out of the region. The limitation is that the LPG volume is an estimate and the jet fuel volume is unknown.

The case for an effective blockade

CENTCOM’s 13 October update, covering roughly three months of the reimposed blockade, reported 4 vessels disabled and 135 turned around. It also claimed 10 tankers linked to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) destroyed and about $25 billion of exports blocked. Neither claim has been independently verified.

The commercial trackers support CENTCOM on crude. Kpler recorded zero Iranian crude and condensate loadings in September, the first full month without any since its tracking began in 2013. Vortexa reported crude exports falling from about 230,000 barrels per day (bpd) to zero by 5 October. Chinese imports of Iranian oil fell to about 590,000 bpd in September, against an average of roughly 1.5 million bpd over the previous year.

Kpler, Vortexa and TankerTrackers.com found no successful crude transit to China after July. Estimates of the oil still in storage depend on how each firm counts it. Vortexa puts 83 million barrels on tankers. Kpler counts about 45 million outside the blockade zone and about 10 million still to discharge in China. A US military official said ships are assessed individually, some pass for humanitarian reasons, and sanctions status is not the only factor.

Treasury’s caution A Treasury spokesperson said shipping data on evasion deserves scepticism, because ships can fake their locations or load under false identities.

Treasury’s position has two parts. Its counterargument, as summarised by Critical Threats and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW), is that AIS manipulation should not defeat a blockade that also relies on radar and aircraft. That objection is about proof of a physical breach. It does not deny that Iranian-origin product appears downstream.

The best-supported reading is that crude is blocked while products leak at the margins. Treat both the official figures and the tracker reports as partial evidence, and neither as a final count of what reaches buyers.

What the leakage means for Gulf oil flows and Asian product markets

Scale and price drivers

The 4.1 million barrels of LPG equals about three days of the crude China had been buying. On that measure the leakage is small.

The price pressure comes from elsewhere. Saudi Aramco raised its October LPG official selling prices by $55/t for propane to $680 and by $70/t for butane to $730. Middle East refined fuel exports, including LPG, are running at about 60% of prewar levels, against 7.3 million bpd before the disruption.

A Reuters calculation puts about 400,000 bpd of Asia-Pacific jet fuel output at risk because it depends on crude shipped through Hormuz. Brent reached about $104.75/bbl on 8 October and briefly topped $107 on 14 October. Lost Gulf exports, freight disruption, insurance costs and feedstock shortages drive these moves. The identified Iranian cargoes do not.

For import-dependent buyers, the jet fuel supply chain is fragile enough that a single cargo can matter, even though the wider Asia-Pacific shortfall is driven by feedstock lost through Hormuz.

• Gulf oil flows: a naval blockade can cut crude sharply without stopping every product cargo.
• Asian LPG: leaked supply will not set prices, but sanctioned cargoes can compete with lawful ones after several transfers.
• Asian jet fuel: one cargo matters to an import-dependent buyer such as Myanmar, although the wider shortfall is about feedstock.
• Sanctions policy: 17 more vessels were sanctioned the week before the Reuters report.

Enforcement and credibility implications

Enforcement has to reach the whole chain, including transfer facilitators, ship managers, insurers, registries and beneficial owners, as well as Iranian terminals. Earlier evasion networks point the same way.

Important gaps remain in the evidence. AIS can be spoofed, some ships may have passed for humanitarian reasons, and no public bill-of-lading totals or jet fuel volumes exist. Trusting tracker data too much could prove costly if claims are later disproved. Dismissing it entirely risks underestimating how Iran adapts.

Any price premium built on the blockade depends on enforcement holding at the margins. That is the variable to watch.

Past performance does not guarantee future results. Financial projections are subject to market conditions and various risk factors. These statements are speculative and subject to change based on market developments.

Reading the blockade signal: what to watch next

A naval blockade can shut crude exports almost entirely while small, high-margin product cargoes still find gaps through opaque transfer networks. The strongest reading is a working crude blockade with marginal product leakage. CENTCOM’s unverified claims and UANI’s estimated volumes mean the picture is not settled.

Four indicators will tell you whether the margins are widening:

• Further tracker reports of STS activity off Oman and at Malaysia’s Eastern OPL
• New Treasury designations of vessels and facilitators
• Kpler and Vortexa loading data for any return of Iranian crude
• Asian LPG and jet fuel price spreads

This article is for informational purposes only and should not be considered financial advice. Investors should conduct their own research and consult with financial professionals before making investment decisions.