Why CNX Soared and Coterra Lagged Among 2024’s Gas E&P Stocks

Two gas producers drew on the same Appalachian rock in 2024. One finished the first nine months up more than 60%. The other finished the same stretch in the red.

If you assumed that owning gas E&P stocks meant owning a single trade on natural gas prices, that gap is worth sitting with. Basin exposure got both companies into the same peer group. It did not deliver them the same result.

RBN Energy tracked three peer groups of exploration and production (E&P) companies, and the gas-weighted group posted the strongest total shareholder returns over the first nine months of 2024, with a median of about 14%. Writing now, in October 2026, the full-year outcomes are known, and they change parts of the nine-month picture.

Here is what separated the winners from the laggards inside that group, and which of those factors deserve weight when you size up a gas producer today.

How did gas-weighted producers beat the other E&P peer groups in 2024?

On the scoreboard, gas producers won. RBN Energy’s review of third-quarter results for the gas-focused companies it monitors, mostly Marcellus and Utica operators, put the gas-weighted cohort ahead of the other two peer groups on total shareholder return.

The key facts from that comparison, as summarised by Marcellus Drilling in January 2025:

• RBN followed three E&P peer groups across 2024
• The gas-weighted group led all three on total shareholder return through nine months
• That group’s median return was about 14%
• CNX Resources gained more than 60% over the period, while Coterra Energy declined

The backdrop makes the result stranger still.

Outperformance against a weak tape The gas-weighted group’s median nine-month return was about 14%, yet Henry Hub spot averaged just $2.21/MMBtu in 2024, the lowest annual average in inflation-adjusted history and 16% below 2023.

So the group was rewarded in a year when the commodity it sells was historically cheap. That alone suggests the market was paying for something other than spot prices: discipline, positioning, or expectations of recovery.

Marcellus breakeven costs below $2/mmBtu help explain why Appalachian operators could keep drilling profitably in a year when Henry Hub averaged $2.21, and why basin economics alone still failed to predict individual stock returns.

Then the median starts to break down. A cohort containing one stock up more than 60% and another stock falling has a midpoint that describes almost nobody in it. Unfortunately, RBN’s peer-by-peer return table could not be located, so the full spread beyond these two names cannot be mapped.

What this tells you is simple but easy to forget. A strong sector median shows the group was rewarded in aggregate; it does not show that the gas producer in your portfolio captured that return.

CNX up more than 60%, Coterra down: what the two share-price paths show

The nine-month view

The divergence started with capital returns. CNX has repurchased 80.7 million shares for $1.3 billion since Q3 2020, at an average price of $16.70, according to its Q4 2024 investor presentation. In Q3 2024 alone it bought back 2.4 million shares at an average of $26.73, costing $63 million.

Coterra, meanwhile, kept beating its own operating targets. Company disclosures put Q3 2024 output at 669 MBoe/d (thousand barrels of oil equivalent per day), roughly 3% above the top of guidance, though that figure has not been independently confirmed. The share price still slipped.

The full-year view

The fourth quarter widened the gap at one end and narrowed it at the other. CNX finished 2024 with a total shareholder return of 83.4%, its shares climbing from about $20.35 to $36.67. Coterra recovered to roughly flat or slightly positive, between 0.08% and 3.38% depending on the price series used.

Coterra’s full-year operations read well on paper. Production averaged 677 MBoe/d, above guidance, and oil output grew 13% organically, although proved reserves fell about 2% to 2,271 MMBoe.

The pairing shows you that production beats did not drive returns in 2024. Judging a gas producer on operating results alone would have pointed you at the wrong stock.

What drives return dispersion within a gas-weighted peer group?

Start with the terms. Total shareholder return (TSR) is the share-price change plus dividends over a period. A gas-weighted producer is one where natural gas makes up most of its output, measured in units such as Bcfe (billion cubic feet equivalent) or MMcf/d (million cubic feet per day).

Being gas-weighted tells you what a company sells. It does not tell you how management spends the cash, how much oil sits alongside the gas, or whether future prices are locked in. Those choices sort into two groups.

Structural drivers (slow-moving, tied to the business):

• Appalachian pipeline and takeaway limits that cap realised prices and growth
• Optionality on liquefied natural gas (LNG) exports through marketing deals or future export corridors
• Exposure to power demand from data centres, depending on proximity to load
• Willingness to curtail output when prices are weak

Cyclical drivers (shifting year to year):

• Price swings that widen the gap between hedged and unhedged producers
• Moves in futures and regional basis that make one hedge book look smart and another costly, purely on timing
• Investor rotation between commodity exposure and balance-sheet safety

A note on sourcing No named analyst commentary explaining CNX’s outperformance or Coterra’s lag was located. The explanations below are inferences drawn from company disclosures, not sourced analyst views. Hedge books for both companies were also not found, so hedging cannot be assessed here.

Why CNX pulled ahead

CNX’s buybacks have cut its share count by roughly 10% a year since Q3 2020, mechanically lifting per-share value. Its 2024 production guidance of 540-560 Bcfe (an unverified figure) points to volume restraint during weak prices. As an Appalachian pure play, it also gave investors direct exposure to any gas recovery.

Why Coterra lagged

Coterra’s mix, reported at roughly 39% Permian and 52% Marcellus (unverified), may have left it compared unfavourably with both pure oil and pure gas names. Cutting Marcellus capital about 55% as LNG and data-centre narratives gained traction may have looked like less gas upside. Strong production may simply have been expected.

This framework gives you a checklist: capital allocation, commodity mix, hedging and takeaway access, rather than basin label alone.

A repeatable stock selection filter matters here because a sector median hides wide dispersion; screening on capital discipline and balance sheet strength sorts producers more reliably than basin labels do.

Why 2024’s gas equity winners are a poor template for what comes next

It is tempting to treat CNX’s year as a blueprint. Gas markets have a habit of punishing that instinct.

The risks that can turn a winning year around:

• Commodity volatility: Henry Hub and basis move with weather, storage and LNG flows, as 2024’s $2.21/MMBtu average showed
• Hedge roll-off: cash flow can drop sharply when protective hedges expire and are replaced on worse terms
• Capital-allocation reversals: CNX’s 2024 repurchases ran well above the programme’s $16.70 average, and heavy buybacks can be questioned if conditions weaken
• Regulatory and infrastructure limits: pipeline approvals and local opposition can strand economic gas, particularly in Appalachia
• Narrative crowding: LNG and data-centre themes can become crowded and correct hard if fundamentals disappoint

History supports the caution. Through the post-2011 shale boom, the 2014-2016 downturn and the 2019-2020 shocks, gas producers that led one up-cycle often handed back gains when prices corrected, especially if unhedged or over-levered.

Record natural gas production across the United States in 2025 shows how supply growth can cap price recovery, one reason hedge structure and leverage matter more than recent momentum.

Outperformance is cyclical Disciplined producers with strong balance sheets and conservative hedges often trail at the peak of a rally, yet tend to hold up better across a full cycle.

The read you should take is that one strong year says little about the next. Hedge structure, leverage and capital discipline deserve more of your attention than recent momentum.

Past performance does not guarantee future results. This discussion is historical and does not represent a forecast of gas prices or share performance.

What 2024’s gas equity split changes, and what it leaves open

The gas-weighted group led its peers in 2024, but the CNX and Coterra gap shows that capital returns, commodity mix and capital direction mattered more than which basin a company drilled in. Labels sorted the group; decisions sorted the returns.

The limits matter too. Without RBN’s peer-by-peer table, hedge details or named analyst views, the explanations here remain inferences rather than settled conclusions.

When you next weigh a gas producer, three questions do most of the work. How is it returning capital, and at what prices? How exposed is it to price swings and takeaway constraints? And how, if at all, is it hedged?

This article is for informational purposes only and should not be considered financial advice. Investors should conduct their own research and consult with financial professionals before making investment decisions.