U.S. to Issue Deep-Sea Mining Permits Within Months, Burgum Says

Interior Secretary Doug Burgum stepped into a G20 energy ministers meeting in Houston on 14 September 2026 and told the room the United States would begin issuing deep-sea mining permits within months.

That timeline did not appear out of internal ambition alone. It is the product of an 18-month campaign by China to restrict American access to the minerals that run semiconductors, weapons systems, and electric vehicles.

Beijing’s export controls on gallium, germanium, antimony, and rare earths have exposed how dependent the U.S. industrial base has become on a single adversarial supplier. Deep-sea extraction is Washington’s answer, framed by Burgum as “energy addition” designed to broaden supply chains for the U.S. and its allies.

What follows here is a clear account of what is actually happening: who is involved, how the permitting system works, and what stands between the announcement and a functioning seabed operation. By the time you finish, you will know whether this is an imminent industrial shift or a longer-range strategic bet.

China’s mineral squeeze is what made deep-sea mining a national security order

The pressure had been building for the better part of two years before Burgum spoke in Houston.

On 3 December 2024, China’s commerce ministry announced a presumption-of-denial or outright ban on exports to the U.S. of gallium, germanium, and antimony, alongside tighter controls on graphite. Chinese customs data through October 2024 already showed zero shipments of wrought or unwrought germanium or gallium heading to American buyers.

The vulnerability those controls exposed is not abstract. It is measurable, and the numbers are stark.

• Gallium: the U.S. is 100% reliant on imports, essential for semiconductors and defence electronics.
• Germanium: roughly 50% import-dependent, used in fibre optics and infrared systems.
• Antimony: a critical input for flame retardants and ammunition, hit by the December ban.
• Graphite: 100% import reliance for certain forms, central to battery anodes.
• Rare earths: imports of controlled Chinese rare-earth and related products fell roughly 55% year-on-year in certain periods as licensing was suspended.

The economic exposure carries a headline figure that concentrates the risk.

Analysts estimate a complete ban on gallium and germanium could reduce U.S. GDP by about $3.4 billion, driven by disruption to semiconductor and defence manufacturing.

Those import figures tell you this is not a precautionary hedge. It is a response to a supply disruption already partly in effect, which is why the administration’s urgency is real rather than rhetorical.

The economic exposure carries a headline figure that concentrates the risk, and the structural vulnerabilities behind it trace back to years of policy inaction on critical minerals security, a gap the April 2025 executive order was designed to begin closing.

By November 2025, following bilateral meetings, China suspended the specific U.S.-targeted ban until late 2026. But broader licensing requirements and dual-use controls stayed in force, and direct exports of these materials did not meaningfully resume.

That partial thaw is what connects the December 2024 shock to the 24 April 2025 executive order, titled “Unleashing America’s Offshore Critical Minerals and Resources,” which directed federal agencies to expedite reviews and secure minerals independent of foreign adversary control. When Burgum called deep-sea mining “energy addition” in Houston, he was describing the policy end of that supply-chain logic.

How the two-agency permitting system actually works

A single deep-sea mining permit does not come from a single desk. The federal architecture splits along a geographic line, and understanding that line is the only way to read the timelines correctly.

The dividing point is jurisdiction over the water itself. Inside U.S. territorial waters and the Outer Continental Shelf, the Department of the Interior holds authority. Beyond national jurisdiction, in international waters known as “the Area,” the Department of Commerce takes over through NOAA.

The Interior Department track

Within U.S. waters, the Interior Department’s Marine Minerals Administration operates under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act. The process starts with a lease sale that grants a company exclusive seabed access rights, followed by an operational permit review built on scientific data. Interior handles all leasing, resource assessments, and exploration or production leases inside U.S. jurisdiction.

The NOAA track

For international waters, the operative statute is the Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act of 1980 (DSHMRA). NOAA receives, reviews, and certifies applications for exploration licences and commercial recovery permits from U.S. companies. It manages Federal Register postings, public comment periods, Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) preparation, and the ultimate permitting decision.

That second track is already moving. On 19 August 2026, NOAA issued a Federal Register Notice of Intent to prepare a site-specific EIS for a pending application, opening a 60-day public comment period that closes on 19 October 2026, with a virtual public hearing scheduled for 13 October 2026.

The split matters because a permit from one agency does not substitute for the other. A company targeting both domestic and international seabed resources runs two separate regulatory tracks at once, each with its own statutory basis, timeline, and legal exposure.

The companies already in the queue and where their applications stand

Two named companies sit at the front of this process, and their positions are concrete enough to map the announcement onto real operational timelines.

The Metals Company (TMC), through its U.S. subsidiary TMC USA LLC, is the primary test case for U.S. deep-sea mining authorisations. Its application history is the most advanced and the most publicly documented of any applicant.

On 22 January 2026, TMC USA submitted a consolidated application to NOAA for an exploration licence and a commercial recovery permit. The move expanded the commercial recovery area from roughly 25,000 km² in the initial filing to approximately 65,000 km² in the Clarion-Clipperton Zone (CCZ), a stretch of Pacific seabed. The estimated resource across that consolidated area is 619 million tonnes of wet nodules, with further exploration upside.

The milestones that got TMC to this point run in a clear sequence.

1. March 2025: TMC formally initiated the NOAA process for exploration licences and commercial recovery permits.
2. April 2025: TMC USA submitted applications for one commercial recovery permit and two exploration licences in the CCZ.
3. January 2026: consolidated application filed, expanding the recovery area to approximately 65,000 km².
4. May 2026: NOAA certified the “USA B” exploration licence application and cleared drafting of the site-specific EIS.
5. August 2026: NOAA issued the EIS Notice of Intent, opening public comment.
6. October 2026: public comment period closes on 19 October.
7. Q1 2027: TMC expects the final NOAA decision process to conclude.

The pivotal regulatory moment came earlier in the spring.

Around 28 April 2026, TMC reported that NOAA had determined its consolidated application was “in full compliance” with the Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act and its implementing regulations.

The NOAA compliance determination in April 2026 was the most consequential regulatory milestone in TMC’s application history, confirming that the consolidated filing met the statutory requirements of the Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act before the EIS process formally began.

The second named applicant for an operational permit is Impossible Metals, a privately held firm with far less public process detail available. Beyond these two, multiple other companies have applied for exploration-level permits rather than operational ones.

TMC’s expected Q1 2027 decision date tells you that Burgum’s “within months” framing aligns with the most advanced applicant’s own timeline. The announcement has specific grounding rather than vague optimism, and TMC’s regulatory record is the clearest public read on how the process actually unfolds.

What is pushing back: international law, allied governments, and 800 scientists

The resistance to U.S. permitting is not a single environmental objection. It arrives in layers, and the first layer carries legal weight.

The International Seabed Authority (ISA) holds exclusive jurisdiction over mineral activity in “the Area” under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The ISA Secretary-General and member delegations have condemned attempts to bypass ISA protocols through U.S. permits, warning that unilateral action violates international law and the common-heritage principle that treats deep-ocean resources as belonging to all nations.

The complication that sharpens this dispute is that the U.S. is not a party to UNCLOS. That is central to the question of whether its domestic permits carry any international standing at all.

The friction extends to allied and rival capitals. Both France and China have criticised the initiative, with China accusing Washington of violating international law and harming the interests of the international community.

By August 2026, governments were weighing whether to request an advisory opinion from the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) to clarify the legality of U.S.-issued permits in the CCZ and to determine whether other states are required to recognise them.

The ISA negotiations in Jamaica in July 2026 made the legal tension more acute, as member delegations debated moratorium proposals and the status of U.S.-issued permits in waters the ISA considers under its exclusive mandate.

That ITLOS process is where the commercial risk lives. If other states are found not to be required to recognise U.S.-issued permits, minerals extracted under them could face non-recognition or sanctions in international markets. That is a market risk sitting directly on top of the geopolitical rationale for mining them in the first place.

The scientific opposition

The environmental case against seabed mining rests on measurable ecological mechanisms, not sentiment.

• Physical destruction of specialised fauna habitats as nodules are removed from the seabed.
• Long-lived sediment plumes spreading hundreds of kilometres and smothering filter-feeding marine life.
• Chronic noise and light pollution in dark, low-energy deep-sea biomes.
• Potential disruption of carbon storage and methane release, undermining the ocean’s role as a climate sink.

More than 800 scientists have signed statements warning that deep-sea mining could irrevocably harm deep-seabed ecologies. The scientific consensus has a blunt summary.

The International Union for Conservation of Nature describes biodiversity loss from deep-sea mining as “inevitable, and most likely irreversible.”

This resistance is not background noise. It is the most consequential variable between the announced timeline and operational mining, and it runs on a legal and diplomatic track that moves independently of the federal permitting process.

Between announcement and extraction, the variables that will decide the real timeline

Burgum’s “within months” framing and the operational reality of seabed mining are two different clocks.

The permit itself may indeed arrive within months. TMC’s earliest expected NOAA decision is Q1 2027, the EIS public comment period runs to October 2026, and the ITLOS advisory opinion process is an external variable the administration cannot manage.

The honest read the evidence supports is this: the permits may come within months, but extraction is measured in years, and the legal and market risks remain unresolved at both ends.

The international regulatory deadlock over seabed mining governance means the ITLOS advisory opinion process, even if it produces a clear ruling, may not resolve the underlying dispute between UNCLOS-bound states and Washington’s unilateral permitting framework.

The near-term milestones worth tracking are close and concrete.

• 13 October 2026: virtual public hearing on the TMC EIS.
• 19 October 2026: public comment period closes.
• Q1 2027: TMC expects the NOAA decision process to conclude.

There is precedent for caution. Nautilus Minerals’ Solwara 1 project, an early deep-seabed venture, was derailed by technical complexity, financial hurdles, and community pushback, leaving stranded capital behind. Early permitting does not guarantee operational extraction.

Industry experts and analysts view deep-sea extraction as a long-term strategic hedge rather than a near-term fix, citing legal, environmental, and technical hurdles alongside long infrastructure lead times.

Layered on top are volatile critical-mineral markets, massive environmental liability exposure, and the risk of non-recognition of U.S.-sourced minerals by UNCLOS-compliant states. For you as an investor or observer, those are the variables that will define the gap between a permit announcement and a working seabed operation.

This article is for informational purposes only and should not be considered financial advice. Investors should conduct their own research and consult with financial professionals before making investment decisions. Past performance does not guarantee future results, and forward-looking statements are speculative and subject to change based on legal, regulatory, and market developments.